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Emissions Allowance
Under a cap-and-trade system, firms will be given 
(or they will purchase at auction) permits, called emis-
sion allowances, to emit CO2. The advantage of a cap-
and-trade system is that aggregate emission targets are 
met in the most economically efficient, or least-cost, 
manner. This happens because some firms are able to 
reduce emissions at a lower cost than other firms. The 
low-cost firms can reduce their emissions to a level 
where they have extra allowances to sell to high-cost 
firms; the high-cost firms find it cheaper to buy extra 
allowances than to reduce emissions to their allowed 
level.
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Lawmakers Can Also Affect Price of Allowances
There will also be uncertainty, especially at first, 
about policy makers’ commitment to enforcing emis-
sion caps. Many cap-and-trade designs include a safely 
valve that in some way modifies the stated cap, which 
can either increase or decrease the volatility of prices. 
Consider, for example, a policy that issues additional 
emission allowances in the event that prices become 
too high. In this case there is uncertainty about the in-
tercept of the supply of allowances, which introduces 
additional volatility into the market.
In addition to limiting the range in which allocation 
price can fluctuate, price caps on emission allowances 
prevent the aggregate emission target from being met 
in the least-cost manner.
 
As Congress contemplates a cap-and-trade system to limit greenhouse emissions, it’s important to under-stand how such a system will affect the Midwest.
 
Cap-and-Trade Will Create a New Tradable Commodity 
to Be Tracked
A cap-and-trade system will inject a new commodity into 
the economy—emission allowances. Such allowances will de-
termine the quantity of pollutant a firm is permitted to emit; 
under a cap-and-trade system, these will be an important input 
for many firms and an output for others. The system is created 
because firms are required to hold allowances for the emissions 
they produce. The nature of supply and demand will have im-
portant consequences for price behavior of the emission allow-
ances, and therefore important implications for the risk man-
agement efforts of firms all over the Midwest.
Unpredictable Emissions Allowance Price Makes 
Long-Term Planning Difficult
The price of emission allowances, which will depend 
primarily on the total allowances the government permits, will 
be highly uncertain, and their price behavior will likely evolve 
over time. Uncertainty about prices will cause volatility, which 
makes risk management difficult. If firms could only know for 
sure what they would pay for allowances in the future, they 
could plan and adjust. Price volatility of the emission allowances 
largely will be impacted by how the cap-and-trade policy is 
designed. For example, whether firms can bank allowances 
for future use or borrow from future allowances will matter a 
lot. Banking and borrowing of emission allowances allows the 
supply to be smoothed from periods of low demand to periods 
of high demand, which makes price movements more stable.
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Trading Mechanisms for Allowances May Operate 
Like Market for Commodities Like Corn and Soybean
As a large spot market for emission allowances devel-
ops, firms will seek out parties with whom they can con-
tract in advance to lock in the price at which they can buy or 
sell emission allowances. A “forward” contract is an agree-
ment to pay a certain price for a commodity at a certain 
future date.
Whether these forward contracts would mature into a vi-
able exchange-traded contract like corn or soybean futures 
and other commodities is uncertain. However, exchange-
traded contracts already exist for the sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxide emissions allowances resulting from the 
acid rain program of the 1990 Clean Air Act, as well as for 
European Union allowances, although they do not attract 
the kind of volume seen in the more traditional commodity 
contracts.
 
Cap-and-Trade May Increase Energy Costs for 
Farmers and Provide New Source of Income
Most cap-and-trade proposals (including the one that 
has passed the U.S. House of Representatives) exempt ag-
ricultural producers from emissions regulations, but as con-
sumers of energy farmers will be indirectly affected if the 
prices and/or volatility of energy-intensive products like 
diesel fuel and fertilizer change. But beyond this indirect 
impact, the climate bill passed by the House includes a pro-
gram to “provide incentives . . . for activities undertaken in 
the agriculture sector that reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
or sequester carbon.”
It is still unclear how such a program would be designed, 
and the design will be crucial to the Agricultural Incentives 
Program of the cap-and-trade legislation meeting its ob-
jectives. Emissions are a flow variable, regulated in units 
measured as tons per unit of time. Emission allowances for 
carbon sinks, sometimes called carbon offsets, are a stock 
variable measured in tons currently sequestered in the soil. 
It is difficult to design a program that rewards farmers or 
other entities for carbon sequestered in the past while ex-
empting them from current emissions. 
Imagine a farmer who has land planted to a perennial 
cover crop that sequesters carbon. Under such a program 
the farmer may earn emission allowances that could be 
sold. However, if the farmer’s carbon emissions are not 
regulated, the emission allocation must be accompanied by 
Politics, carbon sinks, and variable enforcement will in-
fluence the supply of emission allowances. Prices will be 
highest with low supply (few allowances) and high de-
mand (low emissions cap).
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some kind of long-term agreement by the farmer to not re-
lease the sequestered carbon. Otherwise the farmer would 
be free to plow the soil and release the carbon for which 
he or she was rewarded an emissions allocation. Even a 
long-term contract has problems, because a farmer will be 
willing to utilize a cover crop for only a certain number of 
years. If the farmer plows the soil at the end of the contract 
period, the sequestered carbon may be lost if the farmer is 
not accountable for his or her emissions.
To address this issue, the program could be designed 
so that farmers, by accepting emission allocations that 
they can sell today, elect this land use on this tract to be 
monitored and accountable for carbon emitted in the fu-
ture. This type of program would have high monitoring 
costs, however, and it is difficult to envision a design that 
is both simple (cheap) to monitor and accurately accounts 
for carbon flows and not just carbon stocks at one period 
in time. 
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